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ABSTRACT 
 
The potential impact of past Caribbean tsunamis generated by earthquakes and/or massive 
submarine slides/slumps, as well as the tsunamigenic potential and population distribution within 
the Intra-Americas Sea (IAS) is examined to help define the optimal location for coastal sea level 
gauges intended to serve as elements of a regional tsunami warning system.  The goal of this study 
is to identify the minimum number of sea level gauge locations to aid in tsunami detection and 
provide the most warning time to the largest number of people.  We identified 12 initial, prioritized 
locations for coastal sea level gauge installation.  Our study area approximately encompasses 7ºN, 
59ºW to 36ºN, 98ºW.  The results of this systematic approach to assess priority locations for coastal 
sea level gauges will assist in developing a tsunami warning system (TWS) for the IAS by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Regional Sub-Commission for 
the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (IOCARIBE-GOOS).  
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Historical data suggest that tsunamis have occurred in the Intra-Americas Sea (IAS) region 
approximately once every 3-yr, and destructively once every 21-yr [O’Loughlin and Lander, 2003].   
According to Bryant [2005], approximately 14% of all tsunamis have occurred in the Caribbean.  
When considering only Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. West Coast, and the Caribbean, about 2,590 
victims or 83% of all tsunami fatalities in these regions over the last 150 years occurred in the 
Caribbean [O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003].  As a result of these recorded fatalities and the rise of 
Caribbean population by almost 300% from 1950 to 2000 [CIAT, et al., 2005], protection of human 
life is a primary reason for establishing a TWS in this region.  In this work, historical tsunamis in 
the IAS are analyzed with the aid of a numerical ocean model and the results are used to suggest 
locations for coastal sea level gauges for the most efficient implementation of a TWS for the IAS 
region. 
A tsunami is a series of large amplitude, shallow water gravity waves generated by an event 
capable of displacing a huge volume of water.  Whether a gravity wave is considered to be a 
shallow or deep-water wave depends on the ratio between its wavelength and the depth of water. 
 
Deep-water wave:    λ < 2 H  
Shallow-water wave:    λ > 20 H 
where, λ = wavelength and  H = water depth 
 
While tsunamis are usually generated in deep water, they are considered shallow-water waves 
because the typical wavelength of a tsunami is 220,000-m and the average depth of the Caribbean is 
approximately 2600-m. 
Tsunamis propagate at the shallow water gravity wave phase speed of c = (g H)
1/2, which 
can be in excess of 222 m s
-1 (~ 800 km hr
-1), until they dissipate or encounter a shelf and shallow 
coastal water where they slow to 8 – 14 m s
-1 (~ 30 – 50 km hr
-1) [NOAA and USGS Fact Sheet, 
2005].  Tsunami dissipation primarily depends on the magnitude and character of the tsunamigenic 
event, although bottom topography and bottom type also play important roles.  Eventually, the 
tsunami is likely to impact a shoreline where life and property are then endangered.  This study 
seeks to understand how and where tsunamis are generated in the IAS, how they travel through this 
region, and where a minimum number of sensors should be located to most efficiently warn the 
public of an impending tsunami. 
A comprehensive warning system typically uses a seismometer to detect a geological event 
capable of generating a tsunami, and then utilizes near-by sea level gauges to determine whether a 
tsunami was generated. The system also should be able to predict potential impact locations and 
wave height, and disseminate that information to decision-makers.  Different types of tsunami 
warning systems/networks are currently being successfully employed to measure, record, and 
telemeter both oceanographic and meteorological data.  Standard means of telemetry include 
satellite, radio, cellular, telephone line, or Internet.  One type of tsunami monitoring system 
involves Real-Time Kinematic Global Positioning System (RTK-GPS) technology [Kato, et al., 
2001].  Curtis [2001] suggests a multi-sensor approach.  The Pacific TWS utilizes a combination of 
coastal sea level gauges and Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys to 
acquire data for tsunami detection and for propagation and coastal run-up prediction. 
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submarine slumps or slides, volcanic eruptions, volcano flank failure, and oceanic meteor impact 
can also cause a tsunami [Lander, et al., 2002; McCann, 2006; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004].  Often, 
a tsunami is the result of coinciding events, thus it can be difficult to identify the actual 
tsunamigenic mechanism(s).  Seismic and/or volcanic activity can produce a submarine landslide, 
which can in turn generate a tsunami.  When analyzing events from pre-instrument periods it can be 
difficult to determine if a submarine slump or slide occurred, and the actual direct tsunamigenic 
event, such as this, may remain undetected.  The manner in which a tsunami is generated will affect 
the warning time available [Lander, et al., 1999].  This warning time can be maximized by 
predicting how and where the next IAS tsunami is most likely to occur.  In general, the closer a sea 
level gauge is to a tsunami origin, the more warning time available to other locations around the 
Caribbean basin.   
When designing a TWS it is critical to understand the types of tsunamigenic mechanisms, 
the coastlines that are more likely to be affected by a tsunami, tsunami travel time to those coasts, 
and the resulting effects from historical tsunamis [Lander, et al., 1999].  However, the historical 
record is incomplete.  In this study, we simulate tsunamigenic events with the potential to have far-
field (greater than 1000-km) destructive impacts. The results of the numerical simulations are 
combined with information on human population concentrations around the Caribbean to determine 
the most critical and advantageous locations for the installation of coastal sea level gauges. 
Discussed later, most sub-aerial landslides and volcanic tsunami origins are only locally 
destructive and are therefore not considered in this study.  In order to determine if a tsunami is truly 
destructive at a location, high resolution bottom topography and a model with run-up capability is 
required to predict the extent of inundation.  Wave height along the coast is not analyzed in this 
study because local effects dictate the necessity of very high bathymetric and model grid resolution 
to determine wave amplitude at the seashore.  Run-up results along a coastline can vary by a factor 
of 10 [Hwang and Lin, 1969; Smith and Shepherd, 1994].   
  
Historical Tsunamis in the IAS Region 
Shallow earthquakes, magnitude 6.5 or greater, cause the majority of Caribbean tsunamis 
[McCann, 2006].  O’Loughlin and Lander [2003] describe 127 reported tsunamis in the Caribbean 
basin over approximately the past 500-yr.  Of those reported, the authors find that 53 are almost 
certainly true tsunamis and another 8 are most likely true.  These tsunami events were generated by 
various sources including but not limited to earthquakes, submarine slides/slumps, volcanic 
eruptions, and more likely a combination of those three.  Understanding how past tsunamis have 
affected the region will help determine how future tsunami disasters can be mitigated.   
The historical record of tsunami origins and affected areas is sparse.  The data used in this 
study is from both O’Loughlin and Lander [2003] and the National Geophysical Data Center 
[NGDC, 2005].  These original tsunami origin data have 0.1° precision [Dunbar, 2005, personal 
correspondence], and while there are historical records of areas affected by some of these events, 
for others there is no information regarding effects or arrival location.  Therefore, a numerical 
model is used to simulate historical tsunamis.  Criteria used to select the events that are simulated 
are discussed under Methods ("Creation of Tsunamigenic Events List").  The simulations are 
performed with the Navy Coastal Ocean Model (NCOM), described under Methods ("Modeling"). 
 
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 175 (2006)The Caribbean and Surrounding Tectonic Plates 
In order to fully understand the nature of the earthquakes that may generate tsunamis, the 
plate boundaries and their movement must also be understood.  Tectonic activity due to plate 
movement is the principal cause of earthquakes, 80% of which occur along the plate boundaries in 
the oceanic crust [Woods Hole, 2005].  Figure 1 shows the plates in the Caribbean region, their 
boundaries, and summarizes their interactions.  The Caribbean (CA) plate is bordered to the north 
and east by the North American (NA) and South American (SA) plates, to the south by the SA, 
North Andes (ND), Panama (PM), and Cocos (CO) plates, and to the west by the CO plate [Bird, 
2003; Lander, et al., 2002; McCann, 2006; O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003; Pararas-Carayannis, 
2004].  Sitting on the CA plate are the islands of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica to the north, 
the Lesser Antilles to the east, and to the west is Central America.  The South American continent 
boarders the CA plate to the south [Bird, 2003; McCann, 2006].  
The CA plate is moving eastward approximately 20 ± 3 mm yr
-1 relative to the NA and SA 
plates [Demets, 1993; Grindlay, et al., 2005; Lander, et al., 2002; McCann, 2006; O'Loughlin and 
Lander, 2003; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004; ten Brink, et al., 2004].  Some estimates are as high as 37 
mm yr
-1 [Mercado and McCann, 1998; Sykes, et al., 1982].  The NA and SA plates are subducting 
under the eastern margin of the CA plate, leading to the formation of the Lesser Antilles volcanic 
arc. At the northern boundaries, the CA plate is sliding past the NA plate leading to transpressional 
motion (compressive loading as a result of shear stresses) and uneven or oblique subduction near 
Puerto Rico [Lander, et al., 2002; McCann, 2006; O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003].  The southern 
boundary is characterized by a complex convergent margin near Venezuela and strike-slip faults on 
land [McCann, 2006].  The CO plate is subducting under the CA plate on the western boundary, 
which also forms a chain of volcanic activity [Lander, et al., 2002].  Further explanation on the 
tectonic regime of the CA and adjacent plates can be found in McCann [2006] and Grindlay et al. 
[2005]. 
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Figure 1 – Plate boundaries and interactions from Bird [2003] and tsunamigenic source regions 
from McCann [2006]. 
 
Tsunamigenic Earthquakes 
There is a range of possible outcomes due to seismic activity in the Caribbean, some of 
which are more likely to produce a tsunami [Grindlay, et al., 2005; McCann, 2006; Mercado and 
McCann, 1998].  The nature in which a tsunamigenic earthquake occurs will dictate the attributes of 
a resulting tsunami.  Typically, significant vertical deformation of the sea floor (i.e. a dip/slip 
earthquake) is required for tsunami generation.  This deformation can be due to either isostatic 
rebound of an accretionary prism near a subduction zone or a change in crustal elevation [McCann, 
2006; Okal, et al., 2003].  The direction of movement, depth of deformation, length and width of 
the deforming fault or plate boundary, deformation dip and slip angles, and focal depth will 
determine the size of the tsunami [McCann, 2006; Polet and Kanamori, 2000; Zahibo, et al., 
2003a].  For example, a shallow subduction zone earthquake or an earthquake with a more vertical 
angle of deformation will usually displace a larger volume of water and consequently generate a 
larger tsunami [Bilek and Lay, 2002; Polet and Kanamori, 2000].  The overlying geology also 
determines whether a tsunami will result from an earthquake [Bilek and Lay, 2002; Kanamori, 
1972].  There may be stronger motion at the sea floor than the measured seismic moment would 
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[Okal, et al., 2003; Polet and Kanamori, 2000]. 
Regions where there is potential for an earthquake with a slow rupture velocity, or slow 
earthquake, to occur have a higher potential to produce a tsunami larger than a seismometer would 
otherwise indicate [Polet and Kanamori, 2000; Todorovska and Trifunac, 2001].  When the sea 
floor deformation velocity is on the same order as tsunami velocity (i.e. a slow earthquake, slide, or 
slump) the tsunami may be amplified by an order of magnitude [Todorovska and Trifunac, 2001].  
The amplification may be caused by constructive interference as the tsunami is produced, since a 
slow rupture velocity will yield a longer duration earthquake [Bilek and Lay, 2002].  
McCann [2006] defines seismic tsunamigenic threats in the Caribbean (see Figure 1) into 
the following categories: platform deformation, plate bending, slow earthquake, belts and ridges, 
active faults, and low to high tsunamigenic risk.  These regions are based on the geologic and 
tectonic regime of the IAS, and the plate boundaries/interactions from Bird [2003] coincide with 
McCann’s [2006] tsunamigenic zones. 
 
Tsunamigenic Submarine Slides, Slumps and Landslides 
These types of tsunamigenic events are typically initiated by an earthquake, hurricane, or 
volcanic event such as an eruption or flank failure, but they may also be initiated without an 
apparent catalyst [Jiang and LeBlond, 1992; Lander, et al., 1999; McCann, 2006; O'Loughlin and 
Lander, 2003; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004; von Huene, et al., 1989; Grilli and Watts, 2005].  
Therefore, it may be difficult to determine whether a slide or an earthquake is the source of a 
tsunami.  For example, the tsunami can be caused by a slide or slump that may or may not be 
related to an earthquake.   
Many tsunamis have been generated in areas of the Caribbean where strike/slip plate 
movements dominate tectonic activity [McCann, 2006].  This suggests a slide or slump as either the 
primary or secondary tsunamigenic mechanism because vertical deformation of the sea floor is not 
typically associated with strike/slip plate movement.  Grindlay et al. [2005] shows historic evidence 
of massive slumps or slides along the northern Puerto Rico margin which most likely generated 
tsunamis, and cracking on the eastern edge of the Mona rift that may lead to mass failures in the 
future, similar to past events.  
Understanding how a tsunami forms helps determine their propagation and destructive 
potential.  Since slide or slump tsunami-like waves have a much shorter period than a more typical 
dip/slip type tsunami, they dissipate faster and are typically only locally dangerous [Fryer and 
Watts, 2000; Fryer, et al., 2001; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004; Watts, et al., 2003].  Without detailed 
ocean bottom mapping and analysis it is difficult to determine the potential for a massive slide or 
slump.  Hence, the slide or slump tsunamigenic potential of the IAS is not considered in this work. 
 
Tsunamigenic Volcanic Events 
Volcanoes along the Lesser Antilles chain are the most likely source for volcanic 
tsunamigenic events in the Caribbean Sea.  Overall, approximately 5% of tsunamis are volcanic in 
origin [O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003; Sigurdsson, 1996].  There are many different volcanic 
tsunamigenic mechanisms from eruption to structural failure.  O’Loughlin and Lander [2003] and 
Pararas-Carayannis [2004] review case studies of such events, including tsunamis that were 
generated by the Soufrière Hills volcano on Montserrat Island, the Mt. Pelèe volcano on 
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north of Grenada affecting Montserrat, Martinique, St. Vincent, and Grenada, respectively. 
Most tsunamis of volcanic origin have relatively local destructive effects and/or are 
predictable.  This limits how useful a basin wide TWS will be to protect the public from volcanic 
tsunamigenic events.  Therefore, these events are not considered in this study.  The best defense 
against local tsunamis is public education. 
 
Sea Level Gauges in the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions 
Over approximately the past 10-yr, some 60 sea level gauge stations were installed in the 
Caribbean and surrounding countries by NOAA, programs such as RONMAC (Water Level 
Observation Network for Latin America) and CPACC (Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to 
Global Climate Change), and other locally and internationally-funded programs to examine local 
sea level changes and other weather related research.  Government organizations, educational 
institutions, and independent companies had offered to maintain these stations, but as of February 
2006, most stations are in various states of disrepair.  The majority of which no longer collect data, 
and in many cases, installations are missing equipment.  To contribute to a tsunami warning 
network, most stations will need to be replaced, while others need to be upgraded with additional 
hardware such as a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and/or Geostationary Operations 
Environmental Satellite (GOES) transmitter [Henson and Wilson, 2005].   
As of February 2006, of the 60 stations that had been deployed historically throughout the 
IAS region, 17 are fully operational and transmitting data, 16 are not operational but the equipment 
was accounted for, and 10 are questionably operational.  The remaining stations are either no longer 
operational or missing altogether [Air-Sea Monitoring Systems, 2006; Henson and Wilson, 2005].  
Groups such as IOCARIBE, the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (PRSN), and NOAA are working 
towards the installation of sea level gauges throughout the IAS (see Results and Discussion 
“Operational Sea Level Gauges in the Caribbean”). 
 
METHODS 
This study seeks to determine where the minimum number of sea level gauges should be 
located to maximize the warning time to the largest amount of people.  We analyze how and where 
regionally destructive tsunamis form, propagate, and impact a coastline, as well as the coastal 
population distribution.  We also develop an assessment of where coastal sea level gauges are 
operational so monitoring efforts will not be duplicated.   
Without pinpointing specific tsunami origin locations, we examine areas where a tsunami is 
more likely to occur by using a tsunamigenic event source map [McCann, 2006] and the known or 
assumed origins of 42 historical tsunamis.  This analysis is critical to maximizing warning time 
because a sea level gauge should be installed closest to a tsunami origin.  Propagation, travel time, 
and impact analyses are accomplished through the simulation of historical tsunamis with the 
NCOM.  There are several sub-studies involved in using the NCOM including parameter sensitivity 
and initial condition analyses, and travel time calculations [Henson, 2006].  The amount of warning 
time available is derived from a combination of modeling with the NCOM, developing isochrones, 
and estimating travel time to coastal population centers throughout the region.  Isochrones were 
developed independently and then tested against the NCOM results.   
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minute resolution grid.  The former is used to determine where a tsunami is most likely to occur, 
and the latter is used to understand tsunami propagation and travel time. 
 
Creation of Tsunamigenic Events List 
  A total of 61 tsunamis have affected the IAS region in the past 500-yr.  Event data is taken 
from both O’Loughlin and Lander [2003] and the NGDC tsunami database [2005].  Since most 
volcanic and shore-based landslide tsunamigenic events have localized effects, they are omitted 
from this study [O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004; Smith and Shepherd, 
1995].  Events are also discarded if the origin is located inland, the origin latitude and longitude 
cannot be found, or the event did not originate in the IAS.   
  Each event is qualitatively rated on a scale of 0 – 4 according to the validity of the historical 
observations, and we chose the higher of the ratings from the two databases of rankings available 
[NGDC, 2005; O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003].  In an effort to create the largest list of probable 
events, the 42 simulated historical events have a validity rating of 3 or higher.  All simulated 
tsunamigenic sources are assumed to be regionally destructive. 
  It is necessary to adjust some of the historical origin coordinates to properly initialize the 
NCOM (due to model bottom topography and grid resolution limitations).  Where possible, the 
origin is moved closer to or along a plate boundary, but in some cases they are moved perpendicular 
to isobaths.  Figure 2 shows the final origin locations of the simulated tsunamis.  Table 1 provides a 
list of the events modeled and notes which origins were adjusted.   
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Figure 2 – The locations of the 42 historical tsunamis simulated in this study.  The origin of the 
tsunamigenic events are represented by an “X” (see Table 1).  Some events have a similar origin 
location. 
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adjusted, with original coordinates shown in parenthesis.  Sources: O’Loughlin and Lander [2003] and the NGDC Tsunami 
Database [2005].  No information was found for cells that are blank. 
Tsunami origin  Latitude 
(°N) 
Longitude 
(°W)  Date    Time Validity 
rating 
Earthquake 
magnitude and 
corresponding 
scale 
Source type and brief 
description 
Venezuela  10.80 
(10.70) 
64.20     
(64.20)  9/1/1530          1430  UT 4 Earthquake
S. Belize  16.00 
(16.20) 
88.20      
(88.50)  11/24/1539 2300 LT  4    Earthquake 
Venezuela  10.80 
(10.70) 
64.10     
(64.10)  9/1/1543          2300  LT 4 Earthquake
Leeward Is.  17.50  61.50  4/16/1690    4  Ms 8.0 
Earthquake; dispute 
regarding exact day, 
found 4/06/1690 as 
well 
Jamaica  17.70 
(17.90) 
76.80     
(76.90)  6/7/1692  1643 UT  4  Ms 7.5  Earthquake induced 
submarine landslide 
Venezuela  10.60 
(10.60) 
64.50     
(64.30)  1726         3 Earthquake
Venezuela  10.50 
(10.50) 
64.50     
(64.30)  1750         3 Earthquake
Hispaniola  18.10 
(18.30) 
70.70     
(70.70)  10/18/1751 1900 UT  4  Ms 7.3  Earthquake 
Haiti  18.00 
(18.40) 
72.20      
(72.80)  11/21/1751 0750 LT  3    Earthquake 
Martinique and Barbados  14.40  61.00  4/24/1767  0600 UT  3    Shocks 
Haiti  18.70 
(18.60) 
72.63     
(72.80)  6/3/1770          1915  LT 4 Earthquake
Costa Rica  10.20  82.90  2/22/1798    4    Earthquake 
Venezuela            11.50  66.90  3/26/1812 3 Earthquake
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Tsunami origin  Latitude 
(°N) 
Longitude 
(°W)  Date    Time Validity 
rating 
Earthquake 
magnitude and 
corresponding 
scale 
Source type and brief 
description 
Jamaica  17.70 
(18.00) 
76.30      
(76.50)  11/11/1812 1818 UT  3    Earthquake 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
and Panamá 
9.60 
(9.50) 
82.20     
(83.00)  5/8/1822  0500 UT  4  Ms 7.6  Earthquake 
Martinique          14.40  61.00  11/30/1823 1130 LT   4 Earthquake
Martinique        14.20  61.10  11/30/1824 0330 LT   3 Earthquake 
 
Trinidad and                  
St. Christopher 
12.40 
(12.40) 
-61.60      
(61.50)  12/3/1831        1140  UT 4 Earthquake 
 
Hispaniola and Cuba  19.97 
(19.50) 
72.10     
(72.10)  5/7/1842  2200 UT  4  Ms 8.1  Earthquake (no effect 
in PR) 
Guadeloupe  16.10  62.20  2/8/1843  1435 UT  4  Mw 8.3  Earthquake induced 
landslide 
Cumaná, Venezuela  12.10  63.60  7/15/1853  1415 LT  3  Ms 6.7  Earthquake 
Honduras  16.00 
(16.20) 
88.20      
(88.50)  8/9/1856         4 Ms  7.5 Earthquake
St. Thomas, St. Croix, 
Puerto Rico, Dominica  18.10  65.10  11/18/1867 1850 UT  4  Ms 7.5 
Earthquake; along the 
north scarp of the 
Anegada Trough; 15 to 
20-km SW of St. 
Thomas; St. Croix, St. 
Thomas, and Isla de 
Vieques formed a 
triangle around the 
epicenter; others 
believe it may have 
been of volcanic origin 
on Little Saba 
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Tsunami origin  Latitude 
(°N) 
Longitude 
(°W)  Date    Time Validity 
rating 
Earthquake 
magnitude and 
corresponding 
scale 
Source type and brief 
description 
Puerto Rico  18.10  65.10  3/17/1868  1045 UT  4    Earthquake 
Venezuela  10.80 
(10.70) 
63.80     
(63.80)  8/13/1868          1137  LT 4 Earthquake
Lesser Antilles  15.50  61.50  3/11/1874  0430 LT  4    Earthquake 
Jamaica        19.60  75.50  8/12/1881  0520 LT   4   Earthquake
Panama  10.00  79.00  9/7/1882  1418 UT  4  Ms 8.0  Earthquake 
(landslide?) 
Haiti          19.70  74.40  9/23/1887  1200 UT 4   Earthquake
Venezuela  11.00  66.40  10/29/1900 0842 UT  4  Ms 8.4  Earthquake 
Jamaica  18.50 
(18.20) 
76.60     
(76.70)  1/14/1907  2030 UT  4  Ms 6.5 
Earthquake induced 
submarine landslide 
 
Puerto Rico  18.50  67.50  10/11/1918 1414 UT  4  Ms 8.25 
Earthquake induced 
submarine landslide 
(subduction near the 
Bronson deep [Mona 
Canyon]; cables cut in 
several places) 
Puerto Rico  18.50  67.50  10/24/1918 2343 LT  4    After shock from the 
10/11/1918 earthquake 
Cumaná, Venezuela  10.60  65.60  1/17/1929  1152 UT  4  Ms 6.9 
Earthquake (fault 
activity; slides and 
collapses) 
Cuba  19.50  75.50  2/3/1932  0616 UT  3  Ms 6.7  Earthquake 
Hispaniola  19.30  68.90  8/4/1946  1751 UT  4  Ms 8.1  Earthquake 
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Tsunami origin  Latitude 
(°N) 
Longitude 
(°W)  Date    Time Validity 
rating 
Earthquake 
magnitude and 
corresponding 
scale 
Source type and brief 
description 
Puerto Rico  19.50  69.50  8/8/1946  1328 UT  4  Ms 7.9 
2nd shock from 8/4/46 
earthquake; this one 
located 100-km to the 
NW 
Barbados, Antigua, 
Dominica  15.80  59.70  12/25/1969 2132 UT  4  Ms 7.7  Earthquake 
Leeward Is.  17.00  62.40  3/16/1985  1454 UT  4  Ms 6.3  Earthquake (possible 
landslide) 
Puerto Rico  19.23 
(18.90) 
68.77     
(63.80)  11/1/1989  1025 UT  3  Ms 5.2  Earthquake 
Costa Rica, Panama  9.90 
(9.60) 
82.60      
(83.20)  4/22/1991  2156 UT  4  Ms 7.6  Earthquake 
Venezuela  10.90 
(10.60) 
63.50      
(63.50)  7/9/1997  1924 UT  3  Mw 7.0  Earthquake 
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This study simulates events with the potential to have far-field (greater than 1000-km) 
destructive consequences and illustrates where impacts are possible.  The proximity of the islands to 
each other makes it difficult for tsunami energy to propagate out of the region (or, in the case of 
origins outside of the region, to move into the Caribbean Sea).  The tsunamigenic potential is an 
index that considers both the spatial frequency of tsunamigenic events and the geologic and tectonic 
regime of the region.  This index helps identify where the next tsunamigenic event is likely to occur.  
In order to quantitatively measure the tsunamigenic potential of events it is necessary to place the 
data into bins.  Through experimentation it was determined that 1° resolution is optimal because it 
is large enough to encompass more than one event but small enough to discern distinct geologic and 
tectonic areas. 
The McCann [2006] tsunamigenic event source map (see Figure 1) is used to incorporate the 
geologic and tectonic regime of the region.  Assigning a weighting system (Table 2) to the event 
source map, based on source type, allows it to be used as a relative tsunamigenic risk map.  The 
weights, although subjective, allow for a quantification of the tsunamigenic event potential.  High, 
medium, and low risk can be directly translated into weights (3, 2, and 1 respectively) but slow 
earthquake potential, plate bending, or platform deformation regions as well as active faults and 
geologic belts and ridges also increase the potential for a region to produce a tsunami and are 
therefore assigned a weight of 1.5.  This tends to be more important where areas of high, medium, 
and low risk overlap these regions.   
 
Table 2 – Weight assignments to the tsunamigenic event source map [McCann, 2006].   
High 
risk  
Medium 
risk 
Low 
risk 
Slow earthquake, belt or ridge, 
plate bending, platform 
deformation, active fault 
3 2 1  1.5 
 
The weight attributes of each source type are applied to the 1° resolution grid (Figure 3) and 
when a grid cell or bin is not completely covered by a source type, the fractional area each source 
type encompasses is calculated.  This is multiplied by the weight of the source type to determine the 
weight of the bin.  Multiple weight types in a single bin are combined in superadditive process.  For 
example, if a bin contains 1/3 high risk, 1/5 slow earthquake, and 1/3 platform deformation the 
resulting weight is: (1/3 * 3) + (1/5 * 1.5) + (1/3 * 1.5) = 1.8.  The fractional areas can be both 
greater than or less than 1 since source types overlap.  The final value of each bin is calculated by 
adding the spatial frequency to the potential bin weights (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 – 1° resolution grid, map of the IAS, historical tsunami origins, and tsunamigenic source 
regions.  “X” represents the location of the historical origins. 
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Figure 4 – Sector total weights.  Result of binned historical tsunami origins and weight assignments 
to 1° resolution grid.  Bins without coloring have a value of zero.   
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A numerical simulation of the historic tsunamis helps explain tsunami propagation 
throughout the region, determine which coastlines are likely to be affected, and measure the travel 
time to those locations.  Initial conditions (Table 3) are the same for every tsunami simulation due 
to a lack of specific historical data. 
The NCOM is a three-dimensional model featuring flexibility of model grid discretization 
and numerical methods [Martin, 2000; Morey, et al., 2003b; Morey, et al., 2003a].  Other studies of 
historical tsunamis in the Caribbean have used different models but these are based on the same 
basic equations used by the NCOM [Mader, 2001; Mercado and McCann, 1998].  Some of the 
basic equations of motion that NCOM solves are listed here in Cartesian coordinates from Morey et 
al. [2003b] (Equations 1 – 4).  Although the Coriolis term is accounted for in the NCOM, its 
contribution is relatively small given the simulation duration (6-hr). 
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where,  
u, v = velocity vector terms (m s
-1)   ∇ = del operator   V = unit vector 
Q = a volume source or sink term (m
3 s
-1) t = time (s)    f = coriolis parameter 
ρ0 = reference water density (kg m
-3)  p = pressure (Pa)   S = salinity 
Fu, Fv = friction vector terms (N)    x, y, z = coordinate directions 
T = potential temperature (
oC)     g = gravitational acceleration (m s
-2)     
KM = vertical eddy coefficient for momentum   
 
A leap-frog, semi-implicit time stepping integration scheme is used for the tsunami 
simulations.  This allows the use of larger time steps while maintaining stability and accuracy 
[Morey, et al., 2003b; Rueda and Schladow, 2002].  However, if too large a time step is used and 
the Courant, Friedrichs, and Lewy (CFL) condition is violated, gravity waves (such as those 
modeled for this research) may be slowed down [Bartello and Thomas, 1996; Dupont, 2001].  The 
CFL condition states that the time step must be smaller than the time it takes for a wave to 
propagate from one grid point to the next (Equation 5).  
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 and to avoid dry cell 
conditions as a wave reaches the coast, the minimum water depth is set to 4-m.  Wave run-up on 
land is outside the scope of this study due to a lack of high
topography for the study area, and a lack of high quality h
round truth model results.  The grid resolution is set to 2-arc-minutes to match the resolution of the 
TOPO2 [NGDC, 2001] global bathymetric and topographic dataset, which is used as the model 
bottom topography. 
 
itial Conditions 
K
conditions for a tsunamigenic event is to back-calculate them from historical observations of 
unami impacts [Mader, 2001; Murty, 1977].  However, the historical record for tsunamis in the 
Caribbean region is poor a
works have used a seismic or initial condition m
Caicedo O., 1998] to determine the initial wave parameters while other models such as NCOM and 
OST (Method of Splitting Tsunamis) can also run with user-defined initial conditions.  For this 
veral sensitivity tests were run to determine initial wave amplitude and e-folding radius, 
e.  Results 
Sensi
g  Bott
m)  (s)  (s) 
tal 
time 
(hr) 
C <1  
); ∆t = time step (s); and  x = grid space (m) 
 
Although it is a three-dimensional model, for these simulations the NCOM is run as a 
barotropic model with one depth-averaged vertical grid cell.  Tidal components are not included a
the temperature and salinity remain constant.  All tsunamis are assumed to be shallow water wav
Sea boundaries are open and allow perturbations to radiate out of the model domain.  Land 
boundaries are closed and act as vertical walls with heights equal to the adjacent ocean grid ce
depth (typically 4-m).  Land elevation is set to 20-m above sea level,
 resolution bottom and coastal 
istorical observations/measurements to 
g
E
In
nown as an inverse tsunami problem, a method of determining some of the initial 
ts
nd it is difficult to reconstruct such events with any accuracy.  Some 
odel [Mercado and McCann, 1998; Meyer and 
M
study, se
bottom roughness height, model time step, surface field output interval, and total run tim
e summarized in Table 3.  ar
 
Table 3 –  tivity test results summary 
Initial 
amplitude 
e-fold
radiu
om 
ness 
Time 
step 
Surface field 
output interval 
To
run 
(m) 
s 
(m) 
rough
height (
in
4 10,000  0.003  7.5  45  6 
 
The surface field output interval depends on the temporal resolution required to consistentl
identify the exact moment of tsunami impact.  A surface field output interval of 45-sec was 
sufficient to obtain adequate temporal resolution.  The sensitivity experiments converged on a 
model time-step of 7.5-sec and a grid spacing of 2-arc-minutes, which also satisfies the CFL
condition (see Equation 5).  Based on a celerity of 222 m
-1 -1
y 
 
 s  (~ 800 km hr ), two time steps will 
pass as a wave moves from one grid point to another.   
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 188 (2006)The shape of the initial wave adds the most uncertainty to the results of the simulations 
presented here.  However, too little is known about the initial conditions of all of the events 
simulated.  Therefore, in order to compare the output from each model run, the same initial 
onditions are used to initialize all of the historical tsunami simulations.  Zahibo et al. [2003b] has 
and grid spacing of 6-
sec and 3000-m, respectively. 
c
also used the same initial conditions for 19 historical events, and a time step 
Each tsunami is modeled as a point source using a normalized Gaussian dome with an 
amplitude of 4-m and an e-folding radius of 10,000-m (see Table 3; Equations 6 – 11).  This 
assumes that the entire water column is composed of an incompressible fluid and that the tsunami-
genesis process is instantaneous [Okada, 1985].  This assumption is based on previous works such 
as Kowalik and Whitmore [1991], Shuto [1991], and Mercado and McCann [1998].   
 
The initial shape of the sea surface η is given by, 
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where, A is the initial maximum height of the wave above a resting sea surface (m); R is the e-
lding radius (m); and r is the radius from the center of the perturbation (m).  Given the location 
 initial perturbation, η (r) can be readily mapped onto the ocean model grid 
space. 
sis
fo
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Determination of Coastal Grid Points (CGP), Population Data Integration, and Time Series Analy  
e 
 to 
m 
 varies from country to country and is generally 9,000- to 53,000-m.  
Each CGP is assigned the value of the LACPD population cell closest to it.   
Analyses of population data within the model study region are conducted to determine th
approximate population densities along the coastlines.  In the model, 10,623 grid points adjacent
land are identified in an area approximately from 7ºN, 59ºW to 36ºN, 98º W (Figure 5A).  A close 
up of CGP’s around Puerto Rico illustrates resolution (Figure 5B).  Population data is obtained fro
the Latin American and Caribbean Population Database (LACPD) [CIAT, et al., 2005].  This 
database encompasses the Caribbean and South and Central American regions at a mean resolution 
of 33,000-m.  The resolution
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igure 5A – All 10,623 coastal grid points used in the initial time series analysis study.    F
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Figure 5B – Inset of figure 5A; Close-up view of CGPs around Puerto Rico 
 
The CGP’s bordering the continental United States are not used because, as it is shown later 
(see Results and Discussion), the travel time to where the continental US is impacted by the 
simulated tsunamis is at least 4-hr (Figure 6).  Sea level gauges throughout the Caribbean would 
identify the threat of a destructive tsunami impact along the continental US with at least 3-hr of 
warning time eliminating the need to analyze those CGP’s for this part of the study. 
 
Coastal Grid Points
Coastal Grid Points
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Efficient use of a limited number of sea level gauges requires that each gauge warn the 
greatest number of people possible.  This is achieved through the use of population centers.  A 
population center, due to the high and variable resolution of the population data set, is defined as a 
CGP having a population of over 500.  Once these points are identified, the dataset is edited to 
eliminate replicates and points in close proximity to each other.  It is necessary to supplement this 
list with major tourist locations since these do not necessarily have high populations.  The resulting 
dataset is summarized in table 4 and displayed in figure 7.   
 
Table 4 – List of population centers.  * denotes added tourist location; Coordinates from 
www.fallingrain.com and adjusted to nearest CGP. 
St. Johns, Antigua and Barbuda*  Near Old Harbour, Jamaica 
Figure 6 – Locations of the 8009 CGP’s with population data attributes.  The CGP’s bord
continental United States seen in figure 5A are not shown here. 
 t
Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis*  Kingston, Jamaica 
Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe (France)*  Ponce, Puerto Rico 
Christiansted, St. Croix (Virgin Islands)*  Les Cayes, Haiti 
Marigot, Sint Maarten (Neth. Ant.)* Mayagüez,  Puerto  Rico 
Roseau, Dominica*  Fajardo, Puerto Rico 
Fort-de-France, Martinique (France)*  Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 
Castries, St. Lucia*  Near Jeremie, Haiti 
Bridgetown, Barbados*  Near St. Marc, Haiti 
  
Coastal Grid Points
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 191 (2006)Table 4 (Continued) 
Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines*  Cap-Haïtien, Haiti 
St. George's, Grenada*  Santiago De Cuba, Cuba 
Puerto Limon, Costa Rica*  South Beach, Bahamas (New Providence) 
Portobelo, Panama*  Near Barcelona, Venezuela 
Cancun, Mexico*  Near Puerto Cabello, Venezuela 
Playa del Carmen, Mexico*  Near Carúpano, Venezuela 
Willemstad, Curaçao*  Pampatar, Venezuela 
Cartagena, Colombia  La Ceiba, Honduras 
Barranquilla, Colombia  San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Santa Marta, Colombia  Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago 
near Oranjestad, Aruba  Havana, Cuba 
Puerto Cortes, Honduras  Manzanillo, Cuba 
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is me ecord number (at 45-s n (7) is true when the 
time rate of change of the sea level at a CGP exceeds some threshold.  Travel time is defined as the 
e 7 – Population centers (represente ares).  
 
A time series of model sea level are extr  for each CGP, an
is calculated.  A CGP is determined to n impacted by the tsunam
 
()
2 5 2
2 m 10
−
− > n η  (7) 
 
t, where n is any output r ec intervals).  Conditio
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 192 (2006)time between the model initialization and the time when the first peak or trough above the threshold 
reaches the CGP.  Both peaks and troughs are considered to determine travel time because, due to 
the initial condition uncertainty, phase error may be present.  A peak or trough is identified when 
the time series meets the criteria set forth in both (7) and the condition  
 
 
 (8) 
 
where, m is any output record number (at 45-sec intervals). 
 
Sea Level Gauge Location Determination 
A sea level gauge for a TWS should be positioned to maximize warning time.  Several 
factors such as population centers, locations where a tsunami may occur, travel time or propagation 
speed, and wave dissipation are considered when calculating warning time.  The first Pacific Ocean 
DART buoy detection array was designed to detect a tsunami within 30-min after the generating 
earthquake [Bernard, et al., 2001].  The IAS TWS proposal, accepted by the IOC 
(Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission), recommends at least 15-min of warning time 
[IOC-UNESCO, 2005].  This study calculates warning time by subtracting travel time to the 
population center from the travel time to a sea level gauge.  A population center is considered 
warned if it can be notified within 30-min after tsunami generation.  In general, the closer the gauge 
is to the tsunami origin, the more warning time available to population centers.   
Knowing where a tsunami will originate is essential to determining where a gauge should be 
installed.  The McCann [2006] tsunamigenic source map, used in part to create the tsunamigenic 
risk map (Figure 4), appears to have a gap in a tsunami risk region just north of Venezuela in 
sectors N25 and N26 (Figure 3).  Based on McCann’s methodology for classifying risk or source 
areas, and the frequency of historical tsunamis occurring in those sectors, they should be within a 
region of low risk.  This additional low risk value is added to the value of sectors N25 and N26 as if 
completely covered by a low risk area.  The rest of the bins or sectors without values are discarded 
and the upper ~ 5%, or 15 of the remaining sectors are considered to be where tsunami-genesis risk 
is relatively highest (Figure 8). 
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 discussed later.  For simplicity, gauge locations are referred to as 
the sector they correspond to.   
 
Location Priority for Coastal Sea Level Gauges
D
J
M
P
8 – Top 5% of risk sectors.  The color bar shown here is different than that shown in figure 
4. 
 
Travel time is measured from the center of the shaded sectors in Figure 8 to the nearest poi
of land and to the population centers using a series of isochrones.  The recommended gauge locatio
corresponds to the point of land nearest to the center of the relatively higher risk tsunamigenic 
sectors.  With this strategy, each point closest to a high-risk sector should receive a sea level gauge 
resulting in 15 locations.  However, some sectors are closest to the same point of land and the final 
number of locations identified is
 
Through an iterative experimental process a simple decision matrix is developed to evaluate 
the relatively highest risk sectors in the following categories: 
i.  Sector risk value 
ii.  Number of population centers the sector’s gauge can warn in time 
iii.  Number of population centers less than 1000-km away 
iv.  Number of sectors closest to one potential gauge location 
v.  Number of sectors sharing a border 
Each sector is assigned a rank in all categories, the ranks are added together, and the sector with the 
lowest number is assigned an overall rank of 1, the second lowest a rank of 2, etc.  The final priority 
list includes all aspects with equal consideration since all ranks are simply added together. 
> 3 - 3.5
3.6 - 4.0
4.1 - 4.5
4.6 - 5.0
5.1 - 5.5
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 194 (2006)The sector risk values are ranked so the sector with the highest relative risk receives first 
priority.  This means that, to a first order, a sea level gauge is most useful within or nearest to a 
sector that is the most likely to generate a tsunami.  This location, though, may not be able to warn 
as many population centers as another, reducing its effectiveness. 
According to the warning time criteria of 30-min, each location has the potential to warn a 
certain number of population centers.  However, in the Caribbean, the risk to population centers is 
low if they are at least 1000-km away from the tsunami origin [Zahibo, et al., 2003b].  A direct line 
distance is used in this study, since the resulting complex island reflections and refractions soon 
after tsunami generation make it difficult to perform accurate ray tracing.  The list of population 
centers each gauge can warn is reduced to those less than or equal to approximately 1000-km away 
from the center of the sector.  The sector and corresponding gauge that warns the most population 
centers less than or equal to approximately 1000-km away is given higher priority.   
In some cases, different risk sectors are closest to the same point of land (Figure 10).  It is 
more efficient to install a sea level gauge on a point of land closest to more than one sector.  This 
gives the gauge the ability to warn of a tsunami originating from multiple sectors.  Higher priority is 
allocated to sectors that share a gauge location. 
Population centers near multiple higher risk sectors have increased potential to be impacted 
by a tsunami.  To account for this sector density or clusters of higher risk sectors, the number of 
borders each sector shares with another sector is counted.  In this manner, higher priority is skewed 
towards the clusters of risk centers. 
 
Our systematic approach to assess sea level gauge location and priority should assist in 
evelop
IAS co
RESULTS and DISCUSSION 
d ing an IAS TWS.  Here we review the modeling decisions and results, vulnerability of the 
astline to tsunami impact, sea level gauge installation location and priority, and currently 
operational sea level gauges within the IAS. 
 
Modeling Validity 
Major aspects of modeling include choosing the correct model, the accuracy of the initial 
conditions, and the validity of assumptions.  Depending on the model used for both propagation and
initial displacement there may b
 
e differences in calculated wave amplitudes.  However, previous 
e estimates [Mercado and 
eloped an isochron time chart for the 1867 Virgin Islands tsunami (see 
Tabl n regions of more 
com  time of 100- to 120-min to the 
Nort approximately 250- to 350-min.  
This  sult of a coarser bottom topography used in 
 and 
show a sea level time series for three Puerto Rico locations:  Aguadilla, Mayagüez, and Boquerón.  
studies have not evaluated whether the choice of model affects travel tim
McCann, 1998; Whitmore, 2003; Zahibo, et al., 2003a].  Travel times estimated here, in general 
agree with those calculated in both Weissert [1990] and Mercado and McCann [1998] and observed 
by Reid and Taber [1919]. 
Weissert [1990] dev
e
plicated bottom topography.  For example, he estimated a trav
 1).   Travel times are in reasonable agreement for open areas, but less i
el
heast coast of Cuba, but the NCOM travel time calculation was 
significant difference may have been a re
Weisserts’ study (ETOPO5), or the breakdown of that model’s ability to simulate a tsunami in 
shallow water, as explained by the author.   
  Mercado and McCann [1998] simulated the 1918 Puerto Rico tsunami (see Table 1)
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 195 (2006)These t , 
 
ey and Mercado and McCann 
[1998] 
 
hree time series are compared to those generated from the NCOM output.  As in this study
travel time to these locations is taken as the time corresponding to the first peak or trough on the
Mercado and McCann [1998] sea surface elevation time series.  Reid and Taber [1919] report 
observations of the 1918 Puerto Rico tsunami.  The travel times th
report generally agree with those produced in this study. 
Any discrepancies with Mercado and McCann [1998] may be because they use a higher 
bathymetric and grid resolution, more accurate bottom topography, and run-up capability (Mercado 
and McCann use a 3-arc-second grid resolution where a 2-arc-minute resolution is used in this 
study).  In addition, the location and shape of the initial wave is also different.  They generate the
tsunami along a multi-segment fault line whereas it is considered a point source here. 
Tsunami Travel Time and IAS Coastline Vulnerability 
Based on the temporal frequency of historical tsunamigenic events, the IAS region is likely
to experience another destructive tsunami at any moment [O'Loughlin and Lander, 2003; Pararas-
Carayannis, 2004; Zahibo, et al., 2003b; Zahibo, et al., 2003a].  Several works have discussed the 
local nature of devastating effects from many hi
 
storical tsunamis [Mercado and McCann, 1998; 
Meyer 
 
 to 6-hr away. 
Figure 9 displays where 42 historical tsunamis have had the potential to impact (based on 
cates the frequency of impact at those locations.  To show where 
the con d in 
n 
 
s displayed in Figure 10.  It can be inferred that where 
e mean travel time is low (≤30-min), the majority of tsunamis impacting that location originated 
osite can be inferred where the mean travel time is high (>1.5-hr). 
 
 
and Caicedo O., 1998; Pararas-Carayannis, 2004; Zahibo, et al., 2003a].  It has also been 
shown that tsunamis generated in the Caribbean can be destructive as far away as 2- to 3-hr 
[Zahibo, et al., 2003b].  In order to determine the IAS coastline vulnerability, here it is assumed that
these tsunamis can be destructive up
the model experiments), and indi
tinental United States has had the potential to be impacted, all 10,623 CGP’s are include
figures 9 – 11.  Some areas are never hit and some are hit by every tsunami modeled.  The two mai
factors controlling this are the origin location and bottom topography.  To incorporate travel time
with impact frequency, the mean travel time i
th
close to it.  The opp
The median travel time helps understand what locations may be more vulnerable to a 
regional tsunami regardless of impact frequency (Figure 11).  Compared to mean travel time, the 
median tends to be lower at locations that are hit more frequently.  The mean travel time is longer
than the median 64% of the time, suggesting that there are more locations that are hit more often 
from tsunamis that travel long distances.  This is an indication of their vulnerability to regional 
tsunami impact. 
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Figure 9 – Impact frequency.  Locations where a CGP was impacted by at least one of the 42 
historical tsunamis.  Colors denote frequency of impact at that location. 
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Figure 10 – Mean travel time.  Similar to figure 9 but here colors denote mean travel time in hr 
to that location. 
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Figure 11 – Median travel time.  Similar to figure 9 but here colors denote median travel time in hr 
to that location. 
 
Sea Level Gauge Location Priority 
This study uses a two-pronged approach to determine the IAS regional tsunami risk.  One 
assumes that a tsunami impact has the potential for destruction up to 6-hr from the origin and the 
other assumes that a tsunami will only be destructive within approximately 1000-km from the 
origin.  The former is important when determining what locations have historically had the potential 
for impact and the latter is considered when optimizing and prioritizing gauge locations.   
Table 5 summarizes the rank of the higher risk sectors by the factors dictating the 
installation location priority.  These factor ranks are combined in a linear fashion to determine an 
overall rank (Table 6).  In the event two sectors have the same value, they are assigned the same 
rank.  The gauge corresponding to the sector with the highest overall rank should be installed first.  
The insertion of the low risk area over sectors N25 and N26 described in Methods (“Sea Level 
Gauge Location Determination”) led to the addition of sector N25 to the list of relatively higher risk 
sectors.   
Table 6 shows the prioritized list of initial locations for sea level gauges recommended to 
provide an efficient warning system.  When two sectors share the same potential gauge location and 
have a different priority, the higher priority rank is applied to both sectors.  Several sectors share 
priority and two different locations are recommended for sector G22.  Priority sharing can be 
resolved in a number of ways.  The importance of one factor can be increased or decreased, a 
multiplier can be applied to a factor, or other factors can be included in the decision matrix such as 
site infrastructure, security of a site, and maintainability.  As explained earlier, this study assesses 
regional tsunami risk of impact based on historical tsunamigenic events, the geologic and tectonic 
regime of the region, wave propagation dynamics, and the location of major population centers 
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 198 (2006)within a range of 1000-km from the center of the higher risk sectors.  Nonetheless, a complete 
warning system should also consider exactly where run-up and inundation would occur and to what 
extent.   
 
Table 5 – Decision rank matrix.  The sectors are arranged in alphabetical order. 
Sector 
Risk 
value 
# of sectors 
with same 
closest land 
# of higher risk sectors 
sharing a border with 
another higher risk sector 
# warned 
< 1000-
km away  Total
F21 5  3  1  2 11 
F22 8  3  1  5 17 
G19 15  3  2  4  24 
G20 13  3  1  1  18 
G21 11  3  1  3  18 
G22 3  3  2  4 12 
G24 14  3  3  6  26 
G28 1  2  2  8 13 
G29 12  2  1  9  24 
H29 9  1  1  10 21 
I29  4  1 1  8  14 
I30 2  1  2  11  16 
N25 6  3  3  7 19 
O7 10  3  3  12  28 
O10 7  3  3  12 25 
 
Table 6 – List of initial sea level gauge locations recommended for a TWS.  Locations listed in 
order of highest to lowest priority groups.  Coordinates should only be used as a guideline. 
Sector  Approximate location for gauge installation  Priority
F21  Arena Gorda, Dominican Republic (18.78°N, 68.52°W)  1 
G22  Isla Mona, Puerto Rico (18.09°N, 67.89°W) or             
Boquerón, Puerto Rico (18.02°N, 67.17°W)  2 
G28, G29  Barbuda (17.64°N, 61.80°W)  3 
H29, I29, I30  La Désirade, Guadeloupe (16.32°N, 61.05°W)  4 
F22  Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (18.50°N, 67.15°W)  5 
G20             
G21 
Boca Chica, Dominican Republic (18.45°N, 69.61°W)    
Isla Saona, Dominican Republic (18.11°N, 68.57°W)  6 
N25  Punta Arenas, Venezuela (10.97°N, 64.4°W)  7 
G19  Las Calderas, Dominican Republic (18.20°N, 70.5°W)  8 
O10  Portobelo, Panamá (9.55°N, 79.65°W)  9 
G24  Isla de Vieques, Puerto Rico (18.10°N, 65.45°W)  10 
O7  Punta Manzanillo, Costa Rica (9.63°N, 82.64°W)  11 
 
Changing the number and location of population centers, as well as the decision criteria, 
may affect the suggested gauge priority.  The population centers are selected based on population 
Science of Tsunami Hazards, Vol. 25, No. 3, page 199 (2006)and tourism alone and may not need to be warned if they are protected by a wide continental shelf 
or other wave energy dissipation medium.  In addition, the number of warnable population centers 
will increase if tsunamis have destructive capability at distances greater than 1000-km.  Answers to 
these possibilities require higher resolution bottom topography, modeling more origins (including 
those that are hypothetical in areas of higher tsunamigenic potential), as well as calculating run-up 
and inundation. 
The installation location coordinates depend on where the center of the higher risk sectors 
are and should therefore only be used as a guideline.  The locations selected are based on the top 
5% of the relatively higher risk sectors and do not constitute a finite list.  Additional areas should be 
considered for sea level gauge installations, including Venezuela near the west coast of Margarita 
Island, the southeast coast of Jamaica, and the southeast coast of Cuba. 
Although table 6 lists only one location per sector, in some cases two or three sensors may 
be more effective.  It may take only one gauge to determine if the seismic event caused a tsunami, 
but this is a binary approach.  It may not give enough information as to where else and to what 
extent the tsunami may impact on a larger scale.  More sea level gauges can be used to detect a 
tsunami originating on either side of an island, and/or also improve travel time and wave height 
predictions.   
A more general approach to a warning system is the installation of DART buoys.  They have 
the potential to yield better predictions because, unlike a coastal sea level gauge, they receive a 
tsunami signal without being compromised by local effects or coastal noise.  Although a DART 
buoy may prove more useful in propagation and wave height prediction as well as cover a larger 
origin area, they may not provide as much warning time.  This approach cannot warn locations that 
are the same distance from the tsunami origin as the buoy, because a tsunami will reach both 
locations at about the same time.  This reduces their usefulness and requires that a robust warning 
system employ a combination of both coastal and open ocean sea level gauges.  
 
Operational Sea Level Gauges in the Caribbean 
Figures 12a and b show the locations of some of the fully operational and proposed gauges 
as well as the recommended locations seen in table 6.  The IAS TWS proposal [IOC-UNESCO, 
2005] recommends that 31 sea level stations become tsunami ready to operate within the IAS TWS.  
The PRSN group has begun installing ten sea level gauges [von Hillebrandt-Andrade, 2006, 
personal correspondence].  A base station located in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, will be capable of 
processing data from these and other sea level stations throughout the IAS.  The NOAA National 
Ocean Service (NOS) has seven sea level gauges installed throughout Puerto Rico and the US 
Virgin Islands.  Two of the PRSN tsunami ready gauges (Aguadilla and Isla Mona) and one of the 
NOAA NOS gauges (9752695) coincide with locations recommended by this study. 
Any sea level gauges used for tsunami warning must be supported as a part of an operational 
system and regularly maintained.  Support can come from a variety of sources because coastal sea 
level gauges are typically a component of a larger station capable of collecting various other data 
including wind speed and direction, relativity humidity, air temperature, water temperature, 
barometric pressure, precipitation, salinity, dissolved oxygen, water clarity, solar radiation, and 
current flow.  These stations therefore have many applications, such as storm surge warnings and 
studies, hurricane forecasting, geostrophic current analysis, land subsidence, plate tectonics, 
commercial and recreational fishing and diving, search and rescue operations, and commercial 
shipping. 
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Figure 12a – Selection of operational and recommended sea level gauge stations in the IAS.  There
are 12 operational sea level gauges sponsored by the NOAA NOS, 13 locations for sea level gauge
recommended by this study, 31 IAS TWS proposed locations, 10 PRSN location
 
s 
s proposed for the 
 11 Coastal Ocean Monitoring and  Puerto Rico Tsunami Ready Tide Gauge Network, as well as
Prediction System (COMPS) gauges shown in the figure.  The alternate location for sector G22 is 
also shown.  Box in northern Caribbean is enlarged in figure 12b.  
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Figure 12b – Inset of figure 12a; Close up view of stations around PR, the USVI, and the 
Dominican
±
 Republic.  Illustrates the proximity of the locations recommended in this study with 
those already installed by NOS and those recommended by the PRSN. 
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The goal of a TWS is to mitigate loss of life and property caused by a tsunami.  Different 
types of systems/networks are currently being successfully employed to measure, record, and 
telemeter both oceanographic and meteorological data for tsunami warning.  This study determined 
prioritized locations for coastal sea level gauges in the IAS based on tsunami generation risk 
factors, tsunami propagation throughout the region, population distribution, and tsunami travel time 
to population centers.  These locations will give the maximum warning time to the largest number 
of people in the most efficient manner. 
A database of all sea level gauges installed or thought to be installed was compiled and used 
to coordinate the recommended locations.  The expansion of the IAS regional tsunamigenic event 
risk analysis was accomplished by combining the spatial frequency of 42 historical tsunamis with a 
modified tsunami source map from McCann [2006].  This study assu es t t  42 tsunamis were 
generated by either a dip/slip earthquake or massive slide/slump and were regionally destructive.  
Each historical tsunami was modeled with the NCOM to show which coastal locations could have 
been affected by historical tsunamis and to estimate the respective travel times.  Animations of 
select simulations are available at http://imars.usf.edu/tsunami/.  Throughout this work a GIS 
database was created which will also be useful to those planning the IAS tsunami warning system. 
This study established that, initially, 12 sea level gauges are recommended, and 3 of these 
locations already have or are planned to have a gauge.  These locations correspond to the land 
closest to the center of the relatively higher risk sectors and should serve as a guide for installation.  
The list provided in Table 6 is not all-encompassing, but represents a start and will primarily warn 
ce.   
nderstanding of tsunamigenic 
vent origins, higher resolution bottom topography, propagation modeling in the littoral zone, and 
inundation mapping.  Run-up and/or inundation calculations must be performed for areas most 
susceptible to tsunami impact (see Figures 9 – 11).  Mercado and McCann [1998] have begun doing 
this for Puerto Rico and this is already a viable product for areas around the Pacific at the Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Center [Titov, et al., 2001].  
Sea level gauges are a part of a l er  tem that records, processes, and telemeters data.  
These stations can provide meteorological and oceanographic data to support other projects such as 
hurricane and storm surge monitoring   prediction, climate change monitoring, and assist in 
improving numerical models [Alverson 005  These type f systems in other areas around the 
US are already used by harbor pilots, ship captains, the U.S. Coast Guard, recreational and 
commercial divers and fishermen, the surfing and sailing industry, scientists, and the general public.  
Therefore, to guarantee continued existence and viability, these stations must have a multi-mission 
purpose to garner multifaceted support because thankfully, tsunamis do not occur very often.    
m  tha he
arg sys
and
, 2 ].  s o
against tsunamis that originate in the higher risk sectors.  To determine exactly where a sea level 
gauge should be installed a thorough site evaluation is necessary.  During the site evaluation, factors 
that need to be considered are those such as access to open water, proximity to a reef or other 
shoaling feature, infrastructure and security of site, and ease of station installation and maintenan
It is difficult to predict where a tsunami will occur and how much damage it will do.  
Quantifying damage prediction for affected areas requires a better u
e
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